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Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency, by 
Timothy O’Connor. blackwell Publishing, 2008. Pp. xiii + 177. $74.95 (cloth)
r. w. FISCHer, University of Illinois at Chicago
O’Connor’s latest volume has six chapters. In the first and second, 
O’Connor defends (Plantingian) modal realism and sketches an episte-
mology of modality. In the third and fourth, he offers a two-part version 
of the cosmological argument. In the fifth, he considers applications of 
Anselmian theism to the nature of contingent reality, the problem of evil, 
the fine-tuning argument, and the metaphysics of modality. O’Connor 
switches audiences in the sixth chapter. Directing his comments to theolo-
gians, he concedes that some philosophical theses concerning God’s nature 
are incompatible with essential tenets of revealed theology; nevertheless, 
he argues, attempts to do without natural theology entirely are hopeless.
The book begins with one of O’Connor’s basic convictions: Some ex-
planations are modal. As he points out, many scientific and non-scientific 
explanations are formulated using modal idioms, and it is natural enough 
to work from the assumption that those terms are not superfluous. But 
O’Connor goes further; he argues that some explanations need to be mod-
al to be rational to accept at all. Consider some explanation-expressing 
sentence of the form, ‘All Fs must be Gs.’ Suppose that the non-modal 
version of this sentence is doing the real explanatory work, having the 
form ‘All Fs are Gs.’ O’Connor argues that it “is not reasonable to accept a 
principle that lacks any positive confirmation and that is, in some sense, 
an ‘open question’—given the totality of our cognitive practice and rea-
soning, it might (epistemic) be false. . . . If, contrariwise, we justifiably 
hold that the principle is necessary, our acceptance of its truth is in good 
order” (p. 13). In other words, if we construe the data as evidence for the 
non-modal claim, then we have to justify the leap from a sentence of the 
form ‘Some Fs are Gs’ to another of the form ‘All Fs are Gs’, which we can’t 
do. but if we construe the data as evidence for a sentence of the form ‘All 
Fs must be Gs,’ then it is reasonable to assert the non-modal, universally 
quantified claim, since if it must be so, it’s so. Therefore, we should not 
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suppose that modal idioms are explanatorily superfluous. This point is 
applicable both to the justification of elementary truths of logic—e.g., that 
all contradictions are false—and to the justification of empirical claims. In 
both cases, the rationality of accepting the claims depends on their being 
formulated using the language of necessity.
The above paves the way for O’Connor’s epistemology of modality. He 
thinks that if we assume that any of our beliefs are rational, then it must 
be the case that some of our general or theoretical beliefs are modal and 
enjoy a priori warrant. Analogously, if any of our empirical beliefs about 
objects and kinds are rational, then some of them must be modal, and they 
must be justified by their explanatory value. Here, though, the modal ver-
sion of benacerraf’s Dilemma looms large: How are the truthmakers for 
our general or theoretical beliefs involved in the story about how we come 
to have these beliefs? If they aren’t involved at all, then even if our beliefs 
are true, this may be nothing more than a lucky accident. So, O’Connor 
sketches the beginnings of a theory on which it is plausible to think that 
our general or theoretical modal beliefs are not accidental:
An evolutionary advantage accrued to cognizer-types that readily assent to 
the actual truth of core logical and mathematical principles and that system-
atize the world in terms of natural kinds; some such cognizers in our ances-
tral history were selected in part owing to this fact; and the truthmakers for 
these actual truths are none other than their modalized counterparts. (p. 59)
This passage does as much to establish a research program as it does to 
answer the challenge just described. It’s also worth pointing out that Quin-
eans can avail themselves of the same resources to respond to the argu-
ment in the previous paragraph. Presumably, an evolutionary advantage 
accrued to the assumption that the world is hospitable to our theorizing 
about it; those of our ancestors who made this assumption, and so trusted 
their inductive inferences, were more likely to survive than their counter-
parts. Inasmuch as evolutionary forces can be trusted to select true beliefs 
rather than false ones—an assumption that O’Connor isn’t in a position to 
question at this stage in the game—Quineans can reasonably affirm the 
non-modal generalizations that O’Connor tries to question.
Of course, there are other reasons not to be a Quinean and, if Plantinga 
is right, then evolutionary arguments like the ones above require the truth 
of theism anyway. So, if O’Connor is setting out a research program, then 
his other commitments make it a promising one, and the way that he mo-
tivates it is a significant contribution to the epistemology of modality.
If making sense of the world does require modalizing, and if we’ve got 
good reason to think that some of our modal beliefs are justified, then two 
major hurdles for the cosmological argument are out of the way. O’Connor 
then divides the argument into two parts. The first is The Existence Stage, 
in which he defends the view that the best explanation of the existence 
and histories of the particular contingent objects there are requires pos-
tulating a being that exists necessarily. The second is The Identification 
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Stage, in which he argues that we have good reason to think that this nec-
essary being is God.
O’Connor seems to think that the natural view to take is that there is 
an explanation of the existence and histories of the particular contingent 
objects there are, and that an explanation that posits a necessary being is 
the most natural one to offer. Given these assumptions, O’Connor spends 
most of The Existence Stage undercutting rival explanations that do not 
posit a necessary being and trying to fend off an objection to the claim 
that a necessary being can do the relevant explanatory work. This setup 
is unfortunate because, although O’Connor denies that he is relying on 
the principle of sufficient reason (or something very much like it), the 
cosmological argument’s plausibility turns on the demand for explana-
tion with which he begins. After all, if one is drawn to the view that there 
are any brute facts, one can reasonably ask why the existence and histo-
ries of the particular contingent objects there are should not be among 
them. Perhaps for this reason, O’Connor circumscribes the aim of his 
argument by saying that his hope is to make it reasonable to accept the 
conclusion of the cosmological argument—not to show that rationality 
demands it.
The first major challenge that O’Connor considers is from Hume, who 
famously postulated a beginningless series of causes, each member of 
which explains the one that immediately follows it. To illustrate the short-
comings of Hume’s theory, O’Connor cites Alexander Pruss, whose argu-
ment is so good that it deserves to be stated in full:
Suppose a cannon is fired at time t0 and the cannonball lands at t1. Now con-
sider the infinite sequence of momentary events spanning all times between 
the two events, excluding t0 and including t1. There is no first event in this 
sequence, as there is no first temporal instant after t0. Thus, though the en-
tire sequence has a finite duration, it still meets Hume’s envisioned scenario 
of a beginningless infinite sequence of events, each causally dependent on 
events that precede it. Hume should conclude that this series is explanato-
rily complete, but this is evidently false: the entire sequence of events has a 
partial explanation in terms of the firing of the cannon at t0. (p. 75)
John Leslie and Derek Parfit offer a second sort of rival; each suggests 
that there is some principle that explains the existence and histories of the 
particular objects there are. Leslie’s view is that “the world exists because it 
should” (p. 76). Parfit thinks that we shouldn’t suppose that the explanation 
of our world’s features should be offered in terms of our world alone—for 
all we know, every world exists, or all universes that are sufficiently good 
exist, or what have you. but however things are on some ultimate scale, 
he agrees with Leslie that these features can be explained by appealing to 
the principle that it is best that these facts obtain. O’Connor rightly points 
out, though, that it is awfully difficult to make sense of how being the best 
is responsible for the obtaining of some state of affairs. Presumably, neither 
Leslie nor Parfit think that our world is caused by the fact that it should ob-
tain, or that it is best that it obtain. but if the explanation isn’t causal, then 
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what sort of explanation is it? It is not clear that they have an illuminating 
answer to this question.
Perhaps the most interesting objection to The existence Stage is due 
to Peter van Inwagen; he argues that the principle of sufficient reason, if 
understood as a demand for contrastive explanations, leads to the conclu-
sion that every truth is necessary. O’Connor points out, though, that his 
version of the cosmological argument doesn’t rely on the view that all 
explanations are contrastive. He subsequently outlines a theory of agent-
causation on which an agent’s intention to act (and subsequent action) is 
guided, but not determined, by her reasons for acting. The key component 
of this theory is the thesis that causal capacities are ontologically basic and 
that agents have them. O’Connor can then say that an agent has the capac-
ity to cause her having some intention, without that intention being the 
product of antecedent states of the agent. So, if the necessary being is an 
agent, its existence, causal capacities, and intentions explain the existence 
and histories of the particular objects there are, and because the intentions 
are contingent, the existence and histories of the particular objects there 
are remain contingent. For all that has been said so far, though, someone 
who denies that all explanation is contrastive could affirm the existence 
of a necessary being without also affirming that the necessary being is an 
agent. So, O’Connor turns to The Identification Stage.
O’Connor begins The Identification Stage by rejecting the view that the 
world itself is a necessary being. His argument against this hypothesis 
turns on the idea that if a being exists necessarily, the necessity of its exis-
tence determines its nature. existing necessarily is, therefore, a basic prop-
erty. but O’Connor thinks it implausible that a mereologically-complex 
entity like the world could have necessary existence among its basic prop-
erties, since one would assume that the world’s basic properties are had 
by its constituent parts—not by the world as a whole. And, if the world’s 
constituent parts are necessary beings, then either they have individuat-
ing essences, which contradicts the assumption that a being’s necessary 
existence determines its nature, or they do not, in which case there are 
contingent facts left unexplained by the hypothesis—namely, the number 
and distribution of the world’s constituent parts.
The rest of The Identification Stage is devoted to arguing against the 
most serious contender to the view that the necessary being is an agent 
(the ‘Logos’ theory), which is the theory that the world is caused by an im-
personal, necessarily existent ‘primordial fount of being,’ which O’Connor 
dubs ‘Chaos.’ He identifies and dismisses a few different versions of Chaos, 
and then devotes his attention to random Chaos, “a ‘chancy,’ indeterminis-
tic mechanism, having the capacity to generate any of a very wide range 
of worlds. [If random Chaos obtains, then it] in fact generated our world, 
though it need not have done so” (p. 94). Here, O’Connor takes a de-
tour and summarizes the virtues and vices of the fine-tuning argument. 
Its major flaw, in his view, is that the fine-tuning of the natural world is 
explained by a state of affairs that is itself finely-tuned—i.e., it includes 
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a personal being with just the right capacities and intentions. If all fine-
tuning demands explanation, a regress threatens. Alternately, we need 
some argument to the effect that the world’s fine-tuning is explanation-
demanding while the world-plus-God’s fine-tuning is not. In its absence, 
the fine-tuning argument fails. That said, if we begin with the conclu-
sion of the cosmological argument thus far, then the fine-tuning argument 
does give a reason to prefer Logos to Chaos—“the conditional probabil-
ity of what we observe, given the Chaos hypothesis and our best current 
theory, is indeed very low. It is reasonable, then, to conditionalize on this 
information and prefer the Logos hypothesis” (p. 109).
O’Connor shifts gears in the fifth and sixth chapters. In the fifth (aptly 
entitled, “The Scope of Contingency”), O’Connor begins with Anselmian 
theism and considers its implications. On this assumption, he argues “that 
it is inevitable both that God create something or other and that He cre-
ate at least a countable infinity of universes (in the broad sense of caus-
ally and effectively isolated totalities or systems” (p. 121). He goes on 
to claim that the inevitability of God’s creating is not incompatible with 
God’s freedom, that the infinitely many universes God creates give us the 
beginnings of an answer to the problem of evil, and that these universes 
give us (yet another) reason to question the viability of the fine-tuning 
argument. He concludes the chapter by briefly revisiting the epistemol-
ogy of modality, in part to recommend the view that “God’s power is the 
ultimate truthmaker for all possibility” (p. 129). This chapter moves at a 
fast and furious pace, and I anticipate that it’s the one whose claims will 
win the fewest converts. I, for one, would much prefer to say that it is not 
inevitable that God create, that God created only one universe, and that 
the problem of evil should be handled with less metaphysical fanfare. If 
satisfying these preferences involves abandoning Anselmian theism, then 
so much for Anselmian theism. Nevertheless, even those who don’t find 
his conclusions compelling should take note of his methodology. If theism 
is a metaphysical hypothesis, then it is legitimate to use any thesis that 
it entails to handle problems that may otherwise be intractable. because 
God is not invoked solely to handle those problems, there is no reason to 
worry about the charge that this is ‘the God of the gaps.’ As a strategy for 
doing theistic philosophy, O’Connor’s approach is unimpeachable.
An excellent example of the strategy can be found in his approach to 
the metaphysics of modality at the end of the chapter. earlier, he handled 
the charge that our modal beliefs are accidental with an evolutionary argu-
ment. This argument does not purport to explain the nature of our relation-
ship with the truthmakers of modal claims; it supposes that there is one, 
and that it is fitness-enhancing. But if God’s power is the ultimate truth-
maker for all possibility, then being designed by God to modalize reliably is 
to have a non-accidental relationship with the Truthmaker of modal claims. 
Indeed, one might even be able to develop an independent argument for 
theism based on the ability of this account—and the inability of others—to 
explain our relationship to that in virtue of which modal claims are true.
book rEviEwS 469
It’s also worth mentioning that this connection between our beliefs and 
their truthmakers enables O’Connor to fend off an important objection. 
Suppose that O’Connor’s hypothesis is correct: Our modalizing ancestors 
were more fit than their non-modalizing counterparts. But realizing that 
one should be cautious because there might be a bear in that cave is a 
long way from realizing that a necessary being is needed to explain the 
existence and histories of the particular contingent objects that there are. 
It’s more or less clear how beliefs of the former kind have adaptive value; 
how, though, do beliefs of the latter?
There is an analogous objection that one can level against empiricists 
about mathematical knowledge. A common response to that objection 
goes like this: It may be obvious how simple arithmetic has adaptive val-
ue, and less obvious how the same value could accrue to number theory. 
but each thesis in the further reaches of mathematics need not be tied to 
some particular evolutionary advantage; once we’ve got simple arithme-
tic, we can build on it using any of the other tools that evolution has pro-
vided. If we ultimately end up with number theory, then number theory’s 
justification is derivative; it accrues to number theory in virtue of its being 
based on the simpler, more obviously adaptive theories that evolutionary 
forces encouraged.
If this response works, it’s because number theory systematizes and 
explains the truth of other mathematical facts. Can positing a necessary 
being allow us to systematize and explain the modal facts that we take 
there to be? If God’s power is the truthmaker for modal facts, then we can 
answer this question in the affirmative. In this case, as in the previous one, 
theism is a fruitful hypothesis.
The sixth and final chapter delves into philosophical theology. O’Connor 
rehearses arguments against divine simplicity and immutability. These ar-
guments are designed to show theologians who worry that the God of 
the philosophers cannot be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that the 
deliveries of philosophical theology needn’t conflict with the claims of re-
vealed theology. He then tries to show that divine sovereignty is incompat-
ible with the view that God exists contingently. This section is supposed to 
convince theologians that some essential tenets of the faith require philo-
sophical articulation, and so that they entail philosophical theses to which 
those theologians should be committed. The odds are good that O’Connor 
is preaching to the choir here, but it’s not a bad sermon, and his argument 
regarding divine sovereignty is certainly provocative enough to be worth 
one’s time.
The great virtue of Theism and Ultimate Explanation is the fact that 
O’Connor begins with the epistemology of modality and eventually shows 
how the epistemology and the metaphysics of modality are related. Ad-
dressing these fundamental issues makes O’Connor’s presentation of the 
cosmological argument far more plausible and powerful than others. be-
cause he tries to cover a remarkable amount of ground in the 144 pages 
that constitute the body of the book, his arguments can be a bit sketchy. but 
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O’Connor’s writing is suggestive enough that one can usually see how the 
details should go, and he exhibits so much good philosophical sense that 
one is inclined to work them out on his behalf. I heartily recommend this 
volume to anyone working in the philosophy of religion or metaphysics.
Tayloring reformed Epistemology: Charles Taylor, Alvin Plantinga and the de 
jure Challenge to Christian belief, by Deane-Peter baker. SCM-Canterbury, 
2007. Pp. xii + 228. $90.00 (cloth), $25.95 (paper)
JAMeS beILbY, bethel University
It is fairly uncontroversial to note that the contemporary philosophical 
landscape is balkanized and that meaningful conversation between the 
various ‘factions’ is relatively rare. It’s not just that members of the dif-
ferent factions have different beliefs; very often there is no agreement on 
what the important questions are and how they should be approached. 
Deane-Peter Baker’s book should be welcomed as an attempt to bring 
together two conversations that have been, until now, happening on op-
posite sides of the ‘philosophical room.’ As Nicholas Wolterstorff men-
tions on the dust jacket, “reformed epistemologists and Charles Taylor 
have been like ships passing in the night.” while Charles Taylor and 
the guiding light of reformed epistemology, Alvin Plantinga, are both 
enormously influential, they have had minimal interaction with each 
other’s work and, for the most part, their adherents have followed their 
lead. The value of baker’s book, however, is not found solely in the con-
versational bridge built between Taylor and Plantinga. This book will 
be appreciated by those who are not already fans of Taylor’s and Plant-
inga’s work, for it constitutes a substantial and original engagement 
with some of the most important questions and concepts in the field of 
religious epistemology.
Baker’s goal for his book is twofold: first, “to demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of combining the reformed epistemologist’s position with an argu-
ment for theism that I will draw from Charles Taylor’s work”; second, to 
“show the value that would be added to the reformed epistemologist’s 
position by such a combination” (p. 2). In the Introduction (not to mention 
the subtitle), baker indicates that the primary focus of his volume is what 
Alvin Plantinga calls the de jure objection to theistic belief—“the idea that 
it is somehow irrational, a dereliction of epistemic duty, or in some other 
sense epistemically unacceptable, to believe in God” (p. 1). As baker notes, 
Plantinga distinguishes the de jure objection from the de facto objection to 
theistic belief—“the objection that, whatever the rational status of belief in 
God, it is, in fact, a false belief” (ibid).
In chapters 1 and 2, baker provides a very helpful and succinct summary 
of the arguments for and against the religious epistemologies of Nicholas 
